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Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions 
and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions†
By Samuel Bazzi, Gordon Hanson, Sarah John, 
Bryan Roberts, and John Whitley*
During the 2008 to 2012 period, the US Border Patrol enacted new 
sanctions on migrants apprehended while attempting to enter the 
United States illegally. Using administrative records on apprehen-
sions of Mexican nationals that include  fingerprint-based IDs and 
other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to pen-
alties and if he is later  reapprehended. Exploiting plausibly random 
variation in the  rollout of sanctions, we estimate econometrically 
that exposure to penalties reduced the  18-month  reapprehension rate 
for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2 
percent. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 
to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. 
Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated 
with a reduction in attempted illegal entry. (JEL K37, J15, J18)
The mandate of the US Border Patrol is, understandably enough, to safeguard USborders.1 Substantial and persistent undocumented immigration from Mexico 
in recent decades has been taken as prima facie evidence of borders that are less than 
fully controlled and therefore as a challenge for policy makers to address. To reduce 
illegal labor inflows, the government uses its enforcement resources—expendi-
tures on patrol manpower, physical barriers, surveillance technology, and punitive 
actions—to prevent and deter illegal entry. In addition to interdicting migrants, the 
intent is to influence behavior both behind the border, by discouraging prospective 
migrants from attempting an illegal crossing, and at the border, by discouraging the 
substantial number of migrants apprehended during illegal crossings from trying 
1 The Performance and Accountability Report of US Customs and Border Protection, which oversees the Border 
Patrol, describes its mission as “managing, securing, and controlling our Nation’s borders” (GAO 2012).
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again.2 In this paper, we examine how penalties on illegal border crossings affect 
the behavior of recently apprehended immigrants from Mexico and thereby further 
the government objective of  at-the-border deterrence.
Approximately  two-thirds of undocumented migrants from Mexico enter the 
United States by crossing the  US-Mexico land border (Passel and Cohn 2016). Until 
2005, over 95 percent of Mexican nationals apprehended while trying to cross the 
border unlawfully were granted voluntary return, under which they were released 
into Mexico and subject to no further repercussion. In 2008, the US Border Patrol 
sought to deter new and repeated attempts at illegal entry by replacing voluntary 
return with sanctions imposed under a Consequence Delivery System (CDS) (Capps, 
Hipsman, and Meissner 2017). By 2012, the share of apprehended Mexican nation-
als granted voluntary return was down to 15 percent. CDS sanctions include admin-
istrative consequences, which complicate obtaining a legal US entry visa in the 
future; programmatic consequences, which disrupt smuggling networks by relocat-
ing a migrant far from the point of capture before release into Mexico; and criminal 
consequences, which entail prosecution in US courts. The CDS rollout was followed 
by a sharp decline in recidivism: the share of apprehended migrants  reapprehended 
within the next 18 months fell from  28.1 percent in 2005 to  17.5 percent in 2012. 
We use administrative records from the US Border Patrol on migrants caught at the 
border to estimate the impact of the CDS on recidivism in apprehensions.
The CDS rollout occurred amid 20 years of intensifying US border enforcement 
(Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013). Between 1992 and 2007, the US government qua-
drupled the number of Border Patrol agents (online Appendix Figure A1), which pushed 
the Border Patrol’s budget from $551 million in 1992 to $2.5 billion in 2008 (2015 
USD).3 Despite these efforts, the US population of undocumented immigrants grew 
from 3.5 million in 1990 to 12.2 million in 2007 (Passel and Cohn 2016). Measuring 
border enforcement using Border Patrol manpower (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), 
previous literature finds that this earlier border buildup had at most modest impacts 
on attempted illegal entry (Gathmann 2008; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005; Massey, 
Durand, and Pren 2016), though impacts were larger for the  less-skilled (McKenzie 
and Rapoport 2010), and tightened border security did induce undocumented migrants 
already in the United States to remain in the country (Angelucci 2012).
Since 2007, the scene at the border has changed. Apprehensions are down sharply 
(online Appendix Figure A2),4 and, after decades of growth, the US population of 
undocumented immigrants from Mexico fell from 6.9 million in 2007 to 5.8 million 
in 2014 and then to 4.9 million in 2017 ( Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad 2019). 
Although the Great Recession and demographic shifts in Mexico explain some 
2 On the evolution of deterrence strategies for border enforcement, see Roberts, Alden, and Whitley (2013) and 
Alden (2017).
3 During the period of 1992 to 2008, the 9.4 percent annual growth in the Border Patrol’s budget compares to 4.8 
percent annual growth in total federal government outlays. During the  2008–2012 period that we study, the Border 
Patrol’s budget grew by 9.7 percent annually, compared to 4.3 percent growth in total federal outlays.
4 Mexican nationals were long the majority of those apprehended at the border. Since 2013, the share of 
Central Americans in apprehensions has grown (Online Appendix Figure A2). In strong contrast to Mexican immi-
grants, Central Americans often seek asylum when confronting US immigration authorities, which invokes dis-
tinct immigration procedures and necessarily involves multiple government agencies to adjudicate their request 
( Amuedo-Dorantes, Pozo, and Puttitanun 2015).
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of these changes (Hanson, Liu, and McIntosh 2017), the  post-2010 US economic 
recovery did not engender a rebound in illegal entry, and population changes have 
been too gradual to account for the speed of the  late-2000s immigration dropoff. 
Among recent security measures, Feigenberg (2017) and Allen, Dobbin, and Morten 
(2018) find that a border fence constructed along the land portion of the  US-Mexico 
border between 2006 and 2009 has deterred illegal entry along affected crossing 
routes, while  cross-section surveys of apprehended migrants reveal no connection 
between exposure to the CDS and migrant plans for illegal entry ( Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo 2014, Martínez, Slack, and Martínez-Schuldt 2018).5
Because administrative records on apprehensions have been unavailable previ-
ously, the literature lacks a longitudinal perspective on how Border Patrol sanc-
tions affect migrant behavior. Our data, which cover all adult Mexican nationals 
apprehended at the Southwestern border between 2005 to 2012, permit such an 
analysis (US Customs and Border Protection Agency 2015). When a migrant is 
apprehended near the border, he is processed by the Border Patrol, which involves 
taking fingerprints and recording details of the apprehension, including whether 
the migrant is subject to the CDS. By matching fingerprints across records, 
we determine if a migrant apprehended today is  reapprehended at a later date. 
 Reapprehensions are common,6 with most occurring within a few months of the 
initial capture.7
In conducting our study, we face two empirical challenges. The first is that a 
migrant’s characteristics may be correlated both with the sanctions he receives and 
his  re-entry decision. To remove any mechanical connection between migrant char-
acteristics and sanctions, we restrict the sample to adult men who have been appre-
hended six or fewer times, which represents 80 percent of apprehensions during our 
sample period. The Border Patrol does not release information on the apprehension 
of children, leaving their data out of our sample. Excluding women, who frequently 
migrate with children, avoids the confounding effects of Border Patrol actions that 
shield women with children from certain sanctions. For their part, the small number 
of migrants with many prior apprehensions are typically treated as potential smug-
glers and automatically subject to sanctions. In the analysis, we exploit the vol-
ume and richness of the apprehension records by controlling for the complete set of 
interactions among migrant age, birthplace, apprehension history, and location and 
timing of capture. Identification is based on differences in recidivism among paired 
groups of migrants—one of which is sanctioned and one of which is not—in which 
the two groups share the same birth state, birth cohort, and apprehension history, and 
were apprehended in the same location on the same day, though at different times.
5 Other work examines consequences of changing immigration enforcement in the US interior (e.g., Orrenius 
and Zavodny 2009; Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015; Hoekstra and  Orozco-Aleman 
2017) and how altering US visa policies affects incentives for unauthorized immigration (Liu 2020, Kovak 
and Lessem 2020).
6 Retrospective surveys of Mexican migrants also find that a high fraction of those apprehended at the border 
 reattempt illegal entry (Orrenius and Zavodny 2005; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016).
7 Migrants  reapprehended within a few weeks or months of their initial capture are likely cases in which the 
individual is seeking to enter the United States during a given seasonal  labor market cycle; those  reapprehended a 
year or so hence are cases in which the migrant may be seeking to enter for the following year’s cycle.
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Our identifying assumption is that during the CDS rollout, the assignment of penal-
ties was as good as random, conditional on the controls.
Our approach exploits  hour-by-hour variation in the ability of the Border Patrol 
to deliver sanctions. During the implementation of the CDS, individual Border 
Patrol sectors had discretion in when and how to deliver penalties.8 Sanctions 
capacity is constrained by the supply of Border Patrol officer time—officers have 
multiple duties to fulfill and imposing sanctions quadruples time required to pro-
cess an apprehension—and resources needed from other government agencies—
such as space in immigration courts or detention facilities (Capps, Hipsman, and 
Meissner 2017). Because crossing the border illegally is typically a  multiday affair 
through rugged terrain distant from population centers, there is little predictabil-
ity in the exact time or location when a migrant may encounter the Border Patrol 
during a crossing attempt. This unpredictability, combined with the large volume of 
attempted crossings, creates  high-frequency volatility in apprehensions. Whereas 
some migrants in our sample were captured following a temporary lull in appre-
hensions, others were captured following a spike in apprehensions. Relative to the 
latter group, the former group would be more likely to encounter slack constraints 
in sanctions capacity, and more likely, all else equal, to be subject to sanctions. 
Consistent with this reasoning, we find that conditional on the set of controls, the 
probability that a migrant is sanctioned is strongly negatively correlated with the 
regional volume of apprehensions around the time of his capture. And, consistent 
with our assumption that sanctions are driven more by capacity constraints than by 
migrant characteristics, once we control for  date-by-apprehension location inter-
actions, further controlling for individual characteristics leaves our estimates of 
the impact of sanctions on recidivism in apprehensions materially unchanged.
The second empirical challenge we confront is that, analogous to research on 
criminality,9 we do not observe recidivism in illicit activity (attempted entry), but 
we do observe recidivism in imprisonment (apprehension). Our estimated impact of 
the CDS on recidivism combines its impact on the probability of  reattempting illegal 
entry and its impact on the probability of capture, conditional on  reattempting entry. 
If exposure to the CDS has no impact on the future probability of  reapprehension, 
our estimated impact on recidivism in apprehensions will understate its impact 
on attempted illegal entry. If, instead, CDS exposure induces migrants to inten-
sify efforts to avoid capture during subsequent crossings, we may  overestimate the 
impact. To resolve this ambiguity, consider two migrants, each of whom is appre-
hended on his initial crossing attempt, where the first is subject to sanctions and the 
second is not. Because the sanctioned migrant has lost the option of seeking a legal 
immigration visa for some period of time, he may have a weaker incentive to avoid 
 recapture on a second crossing, relative to the unsanctioned migrant. Any tendency 
to  overestimate the CDS treatment effect is thus likely to be weakest for migrants 
with a single prior apprehension. Restricting the estimation to migrants with one 
8 Along the southwestern border, these sectors are: San Diego and El Centro (California); Yuma and Tucson 
(Arizona); and El Paso, Big Bend, Del Rio, Laredo, and the Rio Grande Valley (Texas).
9 For recent work on recidivism in criminal arrests, see Bhuller et al. (2016), Heller et al. (2017), and Agan and 
Makowsky (2018). For a review of the previous literature, see Chalfin and McCrary (2017).
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previous apprehension produces little change in our results, suggesting that risk of 
 overestimating impacts of CDS exposure may not be an overriding concern.
To preview our findings, migrants subject to administrative consequences are  6.6 
percentage points (p.p.) less likely to be  reapprehended in the next 3 months (off 
of a 2008 rate of 22.0 percent) and 4.6 p.p. less likely to be  reapprehended in the 
next 18 months (off of a 2008 rate of 26.9 percent). Migrants subject to any sanc-
tions are 8.1 p.p. and 6.1 p.p. less likely to be  reapprehended at these horizons. 
These estimates are unaffected by controlling for individual characteristics, limiting 
the sample to migrants with one prior apprehension, or restricting the sample to 
time periods when capacity constraints on sanctions appear to bind. The stability in 
our estimates, despite the large number of fixed effects, suggests limited scope for 
 selection-on-unobservables to explain our findings (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005; 
Oster 2019), which stands in contrast to other recent work on recidivism (Bhuller 
et al. 2016). Our estimated magnitudes imply that, holding constant the impact of 
the CDS on the number of migrants who attempt illegal entry, the rollout of the CDS 
can account for  28 percent to  44 percent of the reduction in  reapprehension rates 
over 2008 to 2012.
In Section I, we describe the apprehensions data and the Consequence Delivery 
System. In Section II, we present our estimating equation and consider challenges 
to identification. In Section III, we provide the empirical results. And in Section IV, 
we discuss the implications of our findings.
I. Data and Policy Context
US immigration enforcement falls under the purview of the Department of State, 
which screens applicants for immigration visas, the Department of Homeland 
Security, which regulates US borders and ports of entry and investigates infractions 
of immigration law in the interior United States, and the Department of Justice, 
which prosecutes violations of US immigration statutes. Within Homeland Security, 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) manages and monitors US borders, 
with responsibilities divided between the Office of Field Operations, which han-
dles inspections at US entry ports, and the Border Patrol, which takes responsibility 
for impeding the illegal inflow of goods or people between ports of entry (Roberts 
2015). The job of the Border Patrol is both to interdict unlawful entrants and to 
deter unlawful entry. Some enforcement activities—such as patrolling the border, 
maintaining physical border barriers, and monitoring the border using surveillance 
technology—enhance both interdiction and deterrence. Other enforcement activi-
ties, including sanctioning undocumented immigrants, are primarily for deterrence 
and therefore suitably evaluated in terms of their impact on reducing attempts at 
illegal entry. CBP uses the recidivism rate (the fraction of  first-time apprehend-
ees who are later  reapprehended) and the  reapprehension rate (the number of total 
apprehensions per apprehended migrant) as primary measures of the effective-
ness of  at-the-border deterrence, with the stated goal of driving both rates toward 
zero (Roberts 2015; Capps, Hipsman, and Meissner 2017; GAO 2017a). We study 
deterrence at the border itself: whether sanctions discourage migrants apprehended 
during an illegal crossing attempt from attempting to cross again.
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A. CBP Administrative Data on Border Apprehensions
Our data cover all apprehensions of individuals attempting to enter the United 
States without authorization between ports of entry along the  US-Mexico border (US 
Customs and Border Protection Agency 2015).10 After apprehension, the Border 
Patrol fingerprints migrants and takes biographical information (GAO 2017a). 
Fingerprint records allow us to track individual migrants over time. Because Border 
Patrol policy shields women and minors from some sanctions, reserves voluntary 
return for Mexican nationals, and imposes severe sanctions on the few migrants 
with many previous apprehensions (GAO 2017a), we restrict the sample to male 
Mexican nationals 16 to 50 years of age with six or fewer previous apprehensions.
We study the period 2008–2012, which spans the CDS rollout. Our sample con-
tains 973,171 apprehensions, which represent  79.5 percent of Mexican nationals 
apprehended over the period  2008–2012.11 The Tucson sector of the Border Patrol 
accounts for 53 percent of apprehensions (online Appendix Table A1). When bor-
der enforcement intensified in the 1990s, many migrants switched from  single-day 
crossings near border cities to  multiday crossings in remote eastern Arizona 
(Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016), which lies within the Tucson sector. Nearly half 
of apprehensions occur during the first four months of the year, as migrants arrive 
for seasonal work in agriculture and construction. Apprehensions are evenly distrib-
uted across days of the week and times of day, reflecting randomness in the timing 
of apprehensions that results from  multiday border crossings. Whereas relatively 
few apprehended migrants are from Mexican states that border the United States 
( 11.5 percent ) or states in Mexico’s south ( 7.4 percent ), a majority are from central 
Mexico ( 68.0 percent ), as consistent with historical patterns (Massey, Goldring, and 
Durand 1994).
Figure 1 plots the fraction of apprehended migrants who were  reapprehended in 
the following 3, 6, 12, or 18 months. While  reapprehension rates are roughly stable 
between 2005 and 2009, they drop sharply in ensuing years, which span the CDS 
rollout. The  2005–2012 decline in the  reapprehension rate is 8.2 p.p. at the  3-month 
frequency and 10.6 p.p. at the  18-month frequency. This decline in recidivism is 
corroborated by the  EMIF-Norte (Survey of Migration in the Northern Border, El 
Colegio de la Frontera Norte 2015), which surveys apprehended migrants return-
ing to Mexico (see online Appendix Figure A3). Its data show that the fraction of 
apprehended Mexican nationals stating they will  reattempt a border crossing within 
3 months fell from 77 percent in 2009 to 49 percent in 2013.12
10 Most apprehensions of deportable aliens occur between ports of entry at the  US-Mexico border and therefore 
are the result of operations by the US Border Patrol. A deportable alien is someone present in the United States 
without having been admitted, who is encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the border, and 
who has not been present in the United States for a  14-day period immediately before their arrest.
11 We requested apprehension records covering the CDS rollout and were given data for adult Mexican nationals 
over this time period. To our knowledge, this is the first time that CBP has released such data for academic research.
12 The population of migrants in  EMIF-Norte surveys is reweighted to match the age, gender, and birth region 
of migrants apprehended by the Border Patrol. See Roberts (2017) for further discussion. By design,  EMIF-Norte 
surveys do not track individual migrants over time, which complicates their use in the analysis of recidivism.
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B. The Consequence Delivery System
A foreign national who enters the United States without authorization is in vio-
lation of US law. Although the Border Patrol may refer any apprehended migrant 
for criminal prosecution, for decades standard practice was to offer apprehended 
Mexican nationals voluntary return (Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013), under 
which a migrant forgoes the right to appear before a judge and agrees to depart the 
United States after transport to the border. He avoids formal removal and thereby 
escapes legal repercussions from his offense. Historically, the sheer volume of 
apprehensions, which averaged 1.2 million annually over 1999 to 2007 (Office of 
Immigration Statistics 2009), in part justified voluntary return. Another motivation 
was that during its early history, an implicit mandate of the Border Patrol was to 
help regulate the supply of  low-skilled labor in the US border region (Calavita 2010, 
Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013).13 Under voluntary return, migrants may have 
reasonably interpreted border enforcement as serving to modulate the flow of labor 
across the border, rather than to prevent it altogether.
Today, nearly all apprehended migrants face sanctions under the CDS.14 
Administrative consequences take the form of an order of expedited removal, for 
13 Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) find that over the period 1970 to 1997 border enforcement weakened in 
the months following positive labor demand shocks to US sectors that employ undocumented labor intensively, 
suggesting that the Border Patrol may have adjusted enforcement intensity to accommodate changes in US labor 
market conditions.
14 The CDS, as part of the Border Patrol’s strategy of  at-the-border deterrence, was intended to reduce recidi-
vism in apprehensions. Customs and Border Protection saw the decline in recidivism following the CDS rollout as 
a sign of its success (Roberts 2017, Office of Immigration Statistics 2019). Around the same time, US Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) expanded its operations to locate and deport undocumented immigrants in the 
interior United States. Whereas the Border Patrol apprehends those in the act of entering the United States unlaw-
fully, ICE, by virtue of its purview over interior enforcement, concentrates on the established undocumented 
Figure 1.  Reapprehension Rate following Initial Apprehension for Male Mexican Nationals
Note: Data are from CBP administrative records showing the  reapprehension rates for the population of male 
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those who have never been formally removed from the United States, or an order 
of reinstatement of removal, for those under an existing removal order (Rosenblum 
2013).15 Migrants subject to removal are not detained. Instead, they are processed by 
the Border Patrol and transferred to the border for release into Mexico. Processing 
a removal order requires 90 minutes of officer time, compared to 15 minutes for a 
voluntary return (Capps, Hipsman, and Meissner 2017). A removal order, which 
is tied to an individual’s fingerprints, precludes the migrant from applying for a 
legal entry visa for five years, or longer, and may count as a prior infraction in any 
future dealings with US law enforcement. Because many undocumented immigrants 
from Mexico have applied for a US green card and are awaiting adjudication of 
their request (which can take several years), this penalty is onerous. In the New 
Immigrant Survey, Massey and Malone (2002) document that 41 percent of Mexican 
nationals who obtained a US green card in 2003 had crossed the US border illegally. 
Administrative consequences thus raise the expected costs to migrants of attempting 
to enter the United States without authorization. The share of apprehended Mexican 
nationals subject to administrative consequences rose from  15.5 percent in 2008 
to  73.9 percent in 2012 (Figure 2).
Programmatic consequences are used to disrupt smuggling networks. Given the 
high probability of apprehension for a Mexican national attempting illegal entry at the 
border—which ranges from 40 percent to 60 percent during our sample period—the 
population. (For research on interior enforcement, see Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael 
2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015; Hoekstra and  Orozco-Aleman 2017.)
15 Expedited removal and reinstatement of removal were introduced in the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt/hrpt828/ CRPT-104hrpt828.pdf).
Figure 2. Rollout of Consequence Delivery System
Note: Data are from CBP administrative records showing the share of apprehended male Mexican nationals 16 to 
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large majority of migrants hire a smuggler.16 The smuggling fee may cover the cost 
of multiple attempts to cross the border, in the event an initial try ends in apprehen-
sion (Chávez 2011). For a given series of attempts to cross the border, migrants are 
thus tied to a particular smuggler. The main programmatic consequence is the Alien 
Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), under which an apprehended Mexican national, 
after being subject to other penalties, is repatriated at a location far from his entry 
point, which complicates reconnecting with his smuggler. Angelucci (2015) finds 
that among households in Mexico the decision to send a migrant to the United States 
responds strongly to income shocks, consistent with financial constraints limiting 
the ability of households to afford smuggling fees. Being subject to ATEP thus may 
impede some households from being able to finance further attempts to cross the 
border by their members. The use of ATEP, which only applies to  nonminor males, 
began in 2009 in the four  westernmost Border Patrol sectors and is now used in 
seven (of nine) sectors. Programmatic consequences applied to  14.8 percent of those 
apprehended in their initial year of 2009 and to  49.2 percent in 2012 (Figure 2).
Under criminal consequences, an apprehended migrant is subject to prosecu-
tion. Most occur under Operation Streamline, under which a migrant is tried for 
misdemeanor unlawful entry and appears with a group of migrants for sentencing. 
Although sentences may be up to 180 days for a first offense,  first-time offenders 
are typically sentenced to time served while awaiting a hearing. If the migrant has 
many prior apprehensions or is suspected of other crimes, he may face Standard 
Prosecution in a US federal district court, which involves sentences of up to two 
years and possibly being tried for a felony offense.17 The imposition of criminal 
consequences was intended to signal the seriousness of the Border Patrol regarding 
border enforcement (Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013). Analogous to the  broken 
windows theory of policing (e.g., Corman and Mocan 2005), subjecting migrants 
to prosecution in court conveys that further apprehensions could bring harsher pen-
alties. Applying criminal consequences requires the participation of the Federal 
Judiciary, the US Attorney’s Office, the US Marshal’s Service, and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE). Criminal consequences were applied to  8.3 percent 
of apprehensions in their initial year of use in 2009 and to  22.6 percent by 2012 
(Figure 2). Operation Streamline accounted for  83.5 percent of these cases.18
After apprehension, Border Patrol officers propose the combination of CDS sanc-
tions a migrant receives. Of the  35.4 percent of sample migrants from 2008 to 2012 
subject to administrative consequences,  49.0 percent were further subject to program-
matic or criminal consequences (online Appendix Table A2). Programmatic conse-
quences, applied in  19.5 percent of sample apprehensions, also brought administrative 
consequences in  51.0 percent of cases. Because programmatic consequences only 
16 See  Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2014); Massey, Durand, and Pren (2016); Office of Immigration Statistics 
(2019); and Roberts (2015, 2017).
17 In the early 2010s, the average sentence under Standard Prosecution was 18 months (USSC 2015). Long 
sentences may reduce recidivism mechanically by incapacitating the migrant. However, the application of Standard 
Prosecution remains uncommon for border apprehensions, accounting for just 1.5 percent of cases in our data.
18 Administrative and criminal consequences may also impose additional psychic costs on migrants. Sanctions 
may change migrant perceptions of procedural justice surrounding border enforcement (e.g., Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 
Tyler 2004). Whereas voluntary return did not emphasize the criminality of illegal border crossing, the CDS does so 
explicitly. Emphasizing the criminality of the act may have raised the disutility associated with being apprehended.
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involve transport before release into Mexico, they do not mandate formal removal. 
Criminal consequences, applied in  8.8 percent of apprehensions, entailed admin-
istrative consequences in  94.5 percent of cases, as it is standard to issue removal 
orders for migrants facing criminal prosecution. Not all US federal court districts 
permit Streamline prosecutions or Standard Prosecution of offenses tied to illegal 
entry.19 Because Border Patrol sectors in these districts tend to use programmatic 
 consequences in lieu of criminal consequences, we combine programmatic and 
criminal consequences when analyzing these penalties.
C. Application and Rollout of the CDS
Historically, the Border Patrol was a decentralized organization, with sector chiefs 
having autonomy in setting enforcement strategy (Calavita 2010). The CDS originated 
in Border Patrol sectors whose leaders perceived that it might be effective in deterring 
illegal entry. It was not implemented across all sectors until late 2012 (Simanksi 2014). 
During the CDS rollout, variation in its application arose in part from  sector-level dif-
ferences in capacities for processing migrants. Applying sanctions is time intensive, 
and staffing levels were initially insufficient to impose penalties on all those appre-
hended. Because some sanctions require assistance from other government entities, 
local resource availability in these entities also affected the delivery of penalties. We 
examine how these sources of variation in the application of the CDS—along with 
daily variation in the number of migrants attempting illegal entry—helped generate 
plausibly exogenous assignment of sanctions to apprehended migrants, conditional on 
their observable characteristics and the conditions of their apprehension.
Discretion in Application of Consequence Programs.—During the CDS rollout, 
decision rules for applying sanctions were based on (i) the origin country of the 
migrant, (ii) the migrant’s apprehension history, and (iii) whether the migrant was 
traveling with family members (GAO 2017a). The highest priority for sanctions was 
migrants from countries other than Mexico or with many previous apprehensions 
(or a record of criminality). The lowest priority was Mexican nationals with no 
previous apprehensions, and the next lowest priority was Mexican nationals with 
a few previous apprehensions. Our sample migrants were therefore relatively low 
priority for sanctions and ones for whom the Border Patrol would have discretion in 
assigning penalties.20
19 From  2008 to 2012, Streamline prosecutions were disallowed by the Southern District of California (GAO 
2017a), which spans the El Centro and San Diego Border Patrol stations; they were also eschewed in the Big Bend 
sector.
20 Border Patrol officers have clear guidelines for how to process apprehended migrants, where specific details are 
set at the sector level (and therefore may vary across sectors). Migrants from countries other than Mexico (or Canada) 
are ineligible for voluntary return and, because they are subject to deportation to their home countries, require greater 
time in processing. By the end of the CDS rollout in 2012,  non-Mexican nationals accounted for 26.5 percent of 
those apprehended at the  US-Mexico border. Though relatively few in number, Mexican nationals under suspicion of 
smuggling or with prior criminal activity or extensive apprehension histories are in most cases subject to prosecution 
and by necessity require greater officer attention. If those awaiting processing include minors, officers must determine 
whether the minors have family members among those recently apprehended, such that they can be removed with 
their relatives. (Although migrants frequently travel in groups and are commonly apprehended in groups, not all those 
apprehended in a given operation are necessarily traveling together. Sanctions apply to the individual and not to the 
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Capacity Constraints at the Level of Border Patrol Sectors.—Costs in imposing 
sanctions meant that on  high traffic days, agents may have been unable to impose 
sanctions on all apprehendees. Consider officer time that would have been required 
to transition fully from a system of voluntary removal to one based on administra-
tive consequences (AC) in each year of the CDS rollout. For each Border Patrol 
sector, we compute the share of officer time that would be absorbed by applying AC 
to all apprehended migrants on each day from 2008 to 2012 (see online Appendix B 
for details). We use sector–day observations on the total number of apprehensions, 
sector–year observations on the total number of agents, and an  in-depth analysis of 
time use by Border Patrol agents in the early 2010s (GAO 2017b). Figure 3 plots 
the results across Border Patrol sectors during the CDS rollout. In the four busiest 
sectors—El Centro, Rio Grande Valley, San Diego, and Tucson, which account for 
86.7 percent of sample apprehensions—most days would have required close to or 
more than 100 percent of agent time to apply AC to all apprehended migrants. Such 
constraints created variation in the fraction of migrants receiving sanctions. From 
2008 to 2012, the standard deviation of the daily fraction of apprehensions subject 
to AC was 0.19 in El Centro (mean of 0.25), 0.32 in the Rio Grande Valley (mean of 
0.38), 0.08 in San Diego (mean of 0.19), and 0.39 in Tucson (mean of 0.51).
Capacity Constraints in Partner Agencies.—While the Border Patrol applies 
administrative consequences, it relies on other agencies to deliver programmatic 
and criminal consequences. Applying ATEP may require ICE buses and drivers. 
With criminal consequences, the Border Patrol requires the US Marshal’s Service 
to transport migrants to court, ICE to hold migrants in detention, the US Attorney’s 
Office to prosecute cases, and the US federal judiciary to hear cases (GAO 2017a). 
Because these agencies face many demands on their resources, they may some-
times lack the capacity to address matters related to border apprehensions. In the 
early 2010s, federal courts requested that the Tucson sector, which first launched 
Operation Streamline prosecutions, limit Streamline cases to approximately 70 per 
day (Capps, Hipsman, and Meissner 2017). From 2008 to 2012, daily apprehensions 
in Tucson hit this cap sometime during the day on 99.3 percent of days.
If variation in the application of the CDS was due more to prevailing conditions 
in a given Border Patrol sector than to migrant characteristics, these characteristics 
should play little role in determining whether a migrant received sanctions. Figure 4 
reports  R 2 from a linear probability model (LPM) regressing an indicator for whether 
an apprehended migrant is subject to sanctions on controls for the location and the 
time of the apprehension, the demographic characteristics of the migrant, and the 
migrant’s previous apprehensions. In panel A of Figure 4, the dependent variable indi-
cates whether a migrant is subject to administrative consequences (AC). In row 1, we 
include only dummies for age, birth state, and previous apprehensions, which yields 
group.) It is only for adult male Mexican nationals without a record of prior criminal activity or extensive previous 
apprehensions—which constitute our sample—that Border Patrol officers have discretion over the application of the 
CDS. The factors that determine whether such migrants receive sanctions include (i) whether the obligatory process-
ing of other apprehended migrants exceeds capacity for assigning discretionary sanctions, (ii) whether the sector has 
reached the daily limit for prosecutions, (iii) whether bed space is available in detention facilities, and (iv) whether 
transport vehicles are available for application of ATEP or MIRP. See GAO (2017a) for further discussion.
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an  R 2 of 0.055.21 When we replace these dummies with indicators for the sector, 
year, month, day of week, and time of day of the apprehension in row 3, the  R 2 
jumps to  0.276 . Adding back in dummies for migrant birth state, age, and previ-
ous apprehensions in row 5 raises the  R 2 modestly to  0.323 . Panel B repeats these 
21 Gronau (1998) shows that the  R 2 in an LPM equals the difference between the average predicted probability 
in the two groups (i.e., how much the covariates differentiate CDS sanctioned migrants from  non-CDS sanctioned 
migrants) and clarifies why the  R 2 in an LPM is less likely to approach 1 than in the case of a continuous outcome.
Figure 3. Capacity Constraints in Switching to Administrative Consequences
Note: Each row shows the fraction of days in which Border Patrol agent time required to impose AC on 100 percent 
of those apprehended (up from the 2007 baseline of 8 percent) would exceed all available agent hours for a Border 
Patrol sector. Estimates are based on equation (4) in online Appendix B.
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regressions for programmatic/criminal consequences (PC/CC). Again, age, birth 
state, and previous apprehension dummies have little explanatory power, whereas 
the sector and timing of the apprehension have substantial explanatory power. 
During the CDS rollout, where and when a migrant was apprehended played a dom-
inant role in whether he was subject to sanctions.
To evaluate the relationship between capacity constraints and the probability of 
receiving sanctions more directly, we expand the regression analysis in Figure 4 
by adding measures of the number of total apprehensions that occurred in the 
same Border Patrol sector in which a migrant was caught, either during the same 
Figure 4. Determinants of which Migrants Receive Sanctions
Notes: Each row of these figures reports the  R 2 from an OLS regression of a binary indicator for the given CDS 
sanction on the covariates listed in the row title. Each covariate is an exhaustive set of dummy variables for the given 
category; the “…” indicates the addition of covariates in the given row to covariates in the prior row with the ulti-
mate row including the full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered by  sector-fiscal  year-month (270 clusters). 
See online Appendix Table A1 for categories used to define dummy variables.
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 six-hour period of his capture or the preceding  six-hour period. Our maintained 
hypothesis is that the higher the volume of apprehensions, the less likely it will be 
that the Border Patrol has spare officer time to process additional removal orders 
as needed to deliver administrative consequences, or that cooperating government 
agencies have the capacity to accommodate additional detentions, transport of 
migrants, or court hearings as needed to deliver programmatic or criminal conse-
quences. All specifications include controls for migrant age, birth state, number of 
previous  apprehensions, and the Border Patrol sector, year, month, day of week, 
and time of day of the apprehension, as in the most exhaustive specifications in 
Figure 4.
Table 1 reports the results. The probability of receiving administrative sanc-
tions, in column 1, is strongly negatively correlated with the current volume of 
apprehensions in a given sector, with this relationship being statistically signifi-
cant at the  1 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate implies that 
increasing the number of apprehensions in the current  six-hour period by one 
standard deviation, or 41.9 total captures, sizably reduces the probability that a 
migrant apprehended in that sector will receive administrative consequences by 
5.6 p.p. In column 2 we add the number of apprehensions during the preceding 
 six-hour time block. Here again, there is a strong negative relationship between 
the volume of apprehensions at the sector level and the probability that a migrant 
receives sanctions. We obtain similar results when we examine the probability of 
receiving programmatic or criminal consequences, as seen in columns 3 and 4. 
These results suggest that migrants apprehended during or after a spike in captures 
are less likely to face sanctions, as consistent with  local-level capacity constraints 
in delivering the CDS.
Table 1—Impact of Apprehension Volume on Probability of Receiving  
CDS Sanctions
Dependent variable = 1 if migrant subject to CDS
AC AC PC/CC PC/CC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Border sector apprehensions: −0.133 −0.089 −0.095 −0.062
Current time block/100 (0.023) (0.015) (0.027) (0.019)
Border sector apprehensions: −0.096 −0.075
Previous time block/100 (0.016) (0.020)
Number of individuals 925,380 889,800 925,380 889,800 
Dependent variable mean 0.345 0.339 0.270 0.268 
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.324 0.410 0.412
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of a binary indicator for a given CDS sanction 
(administrative consequences (AC) in columns 1 and 2; programmatic or criminal conse-
quences (PC/CC) in columns 3 and 4) on covariates that include total apprehensions in the 
sector in which a migrant was apprehended during the same six-hour period as his capture (all 
columns), total apprehensions in the sector during the previous six-hour period (columns 2 
and 4), and controls for migrant age, birth state, number of prior apprehensions, and Border 
Patrol sector, fiscal year, month, day of week, and time of day of apprehension (all columns). 
Standard errors are clustered by sector-fiscal year-month (270 clusters). See online Appendix 
Table A1 for details on the categories used to define the dummy variables used in the analysis.
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II. Empirical Specification
In our main analysis, we evaluate how being subject to the CDS affects the likeli-
hood that an apprehended migrant is  reapprehended in the future. Our specification is
(1)  y ist+τ = β × CD S ist + f ( X it ,  α s ,  α t ) +  ϵ ist ,
where  y ist+τ is an indicator for whether migrant  i who is apprehended in Border 
Patrol sector  s at time  t is  reapprehended anywhere along the border within  τ  periods, 
for  τ = 3, 6, 12, or 18 months;  CD S ist is defined alternatively as an indicator for 
whether the migrant was subject to administrative consequences (AC) at apprehen-
sion, an indicator for whether the migrant was subject to any consequences at appre-
hension, or a vector that includes the AC indicator and an indicator for whether the 
migrant was subject to programmatic/criminal consequences (PC/CC) at apprehen-
sion;  X it includes indicators for the migrant’s age cohort at apprehension, birth state 
in Mexico, and number of previous apprehensions;  α s indicates the Border Patrol 
sector of apprehension;  α t describes the timing of apprehension (year, month, day 
of week, and time of day);  f ( · ) characterizes the manner in which we interact the 
control variables; and  ϵ ist is a disturbance term than captures unobserved variables 
that affect the likelihood of  reapprehension.
To control for factors that may relate both to whether the Border Patrol decides 
to sanction a migrant and to whether he elects to  reattempt illegal entry, we define 
 f ( · ) to generate interactions among  X it ,  α s , and  α t . We first interact only the sector, 
year, and month of apprehension, then add interactions for day of week and time 
of day of apprehension, and then add interactions with migrant characteristics. The 
first specification, with sector  × year  × month interactions, controls for time and 
 location-specific  labor-market shocks that may have affected a migrant’s original 
decision to attempt illegal entry. For instance, if particularly fair weather affects 
the demand for construction or farm labor, such events may provoke an increase in 
the flow of itinerant workers to the border, who may be less determined to cross the 
border than individuals who have decided to move to the United States permanently. 
In neutralizing such variation, we seek to compare migrants who chose to cross the 
border under similar expectations about  labor-market conditions.
The second specification, which additionally controls for day of week  × time 
of day interactions, absorbs any  nonrandomness in the timing of the initial appre-
hension, which may reflect differential knowledge across migrants about the inten-
sity of border enforcement. The third and most complete set of interactions allows 
sanctions to be correlated with shocks that affect the migrant’s  reentry decision, 
as long as these can be modeled by sector  × calendar-date  × age  × birth-state 
 ×  previous-apprehension interactions, which allows perceptions of  labor-market 
shocks and border enforcement to be specific to migrant demographic characteristics 
and apprehensions history. Our approach to identification would be invalid if there are 
additional characteristics of a migrant that affect both his decision to  reattempt illegal 
entry and the decision of the Border Patrol to impose sanctions on him. Because agents 
decide whether to impose sanctions on a migrant in a matter of minutes—and under 
the constraint that they have spare sanctions capacity after prioritizing more pressing 
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apprehension cases—our assumption that, conditional on the controls, the assignment 
of consequences to a migrant was as good as random may not be unreasonable.
Comparing estimates of  β across specifications reveals the sensitivity of the treat-
ment effect to increasingly  more expansive controls for the characteristics of the 
migrant and his apprehension. We formally evaluate possible bias due to selection 
on unobservables using the approach proposed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) 
and generalized by Oster (2019).
III. Empirical Results
In presenting our results on how the CDS affects recidivism in apprehensions, we 
first consider the impact of administrative consequences, then examine other con-
sequences, and finally examine how our findings are affected by imposing sample 
restrictions that either limit observations to those in time periods for which capacity 
constraints on delivering sanctions appear to bind or segment observations according 
to a migrant’s prior number of apprehensions (to assess how impacts on recidivism 
in apprehensions may compare to those on recidivism in attempts at illegal entry).
A. Administrative Consequences
Figure 5 reports estimation results for (1) using our sample of adult male Mexican 
nationals with six or fewer prior apprehensions who were apprehended between 
2008 and 2012. The outcome variables, organized in panels A to D, are indicators 
for whether the migrant was  reapprehended in the following 3 or 18 months. These 
results, along with those at 6 and 12 month horizons, appear in Table 2 (for adminis-
trative consequences) and online Appendix Table A3 (for any consequences).
The first treatment we consider is whether the migrant was subject to administrative 
consequences (AC) at apprehension, shown in panels A and B. In row 1, the control 
variables are complete interactions among dummy variables for the Border Patrol sec-
tor, the fiscal year, and the month in which the apprehension occurred. In row 2, we 
add interactions with indicators for the time of day and day of week of the apprehen-
sion; in row 3, we add interactions with indicators for the migrant’s age and birth state; 
and in row 4, we add interactions with indicators for the migrant’s prior apprehen-
sions. In row 5, we go further and introduce fixed effects for the sector and calendar 
date of the apprehension (e.g., January 12, 2010 in Tucson); and in row 6, we interact 
those dummy variables with migrant age, birth state, and prior apprehensions. The 
plots in Figure 5 include point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals. Table 2 
and online Appendix Table A3 present the full regression output including sample 
size, which varies modestly across specifications owing to the fact that interactive 
 fixed-effect cells without variation in sanctions across migrants are omitted. We cluster 
standard errors by the  sector-year-month combination (270 clusters) to account for the 
common exposure of migrants to policies defined at the sector level at a given time.22
22 Online Appendix Table A7 reports more conservative confidence intervals and  p-values based on clustering 
at the level of the nine border patrol sectors. Given the small number of clusters, we apply the wild cluster bootstrap 
of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). All point estimates remain significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level.
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Consider the estimate of the AC treatment on the  three-month  reapprehension 
rate in row 1 of panel A. The value of  − 0.064 , which is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level, indicates that migrants subject to administrative conse-
quences were  6.4 p.p. less likely to be  reapprehended in the next 3 months (com-
pared to a 2008  reapprehension probability of  0.226 ). This specification controls 
for Border Patrol sector  × fiscal year  × month interactions, which one may think 
of as absorbing location and  time-specific expectations about  labor market condi-
tions and enforcement patterns among migrants prior to their initial attempt. As we 
allow for more interactions between time and location of apprehension and migrant 
characteristics—adding day of week  × time of day interactions in row 2, age 
Figure 5. Impact of Exposure to CDS Sanctions on Probability of  Reapprehension
Notes: Each row of these figures reports the point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval on the dummy vari-
able for administrative consequences, in panels A and B, or any consequences, in panels C and D, in an OLS regres-
sion for  reapprehension within the next 3 months (panels A and C) or 18 months (panels B and D). Each row is a 
separate regression controlling for the fixed effects (FE) listed in the row title. These FE enter interactively where 
the “…” indicates the addition of FE in the given row to FE in the prior rows. Standard errors are clustered by 
 sector-fiscal  year-month (270 clusters). Table 2 and online Appendix Table A3 present the full regression output 
(for panels A and B and panels C and D, respectively).
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category  × birth state interactions in row 3, and prior apprehension interactions in 
row 4—there is essentially no change in the estimated treatment effect. In row 4, 
with the full set of controls, the estimate is  − 0.063 . The  more exhaustive  sector-date 
fixed effects in row 5—which allows for Border Patrol sector  × calendar date inter-
actions—and row 6—which allows for the full set of interactions between migrant 
characteristics, Border Patrol sector, and calendar date—do not materially change this 
point estimate, which is  − 0.066 in row 6.
Table 2 explores CDS impacts on the likelihood of  reapprehension at the inter-
mediate time horizons of 6 and 12 months. Again, the estimated treatment effects 
are insensitive to expanding the set of controls. The estimated impacts vary 
across  specifications at the  six-month horizon from  − 0.054 to  − 0.058 and at the 
 12-month horizon from  − 0.046 to  − 0.050 , with all coefficients very precisely esti-
mated. We do see that the treatment effect diminishes modestly as we expand the 
reapprehension time horizon. Returning to Figure 5, if we compare the row 6 specifica-
tions with the most exhaustive fixed effects in panels A and B, the AC treatment effect 
falls from  − 0.066 at the  3-month horizon to  − 0.046 at the  18-month horizon (2008 
 reapprehension probability of  0.269 ). This attenuation could indicate that some of the 
impact of sanctions is psychological—due, e.g., to the emotional shock of receiving 
a removal order or appearing before an immigration judge for individuals from poor 
communities with limited prior interaction with formal justice systems—where the 
trauma of the experience diminishes with time. Alternatively, it may take time for a 
migrant or his family to build up the financial resources needed to undertake a second 
 border crossing attempt, such that CDS impacts are lower at longer time horizons.
The stability of coefficients across  fixed-effect specifications provides prima 
facie evidence against a large role for selection on unobservables to explain our 
findings. Consider panel A in Table 2, where the  R 2 increases from 0.076 in column 
5, with  sector-date fixed effects, to 0.409 in column 6, when adding interactions 
with age, birth place, and number of previous apprehensions.23 Despite this large 
increase in explanatory power, the treatment effect of AC sanctions remains effec-
tively unchanged, going from −0.064 to −0.066. In other words, adding a large 
number of observable determinants of the probability of  reapprehension does not 
change the observed impact of administrative consequences. This pattern holds 
across our findings by time horizon in Table  2—as seen when comparing col-
umns 5 and 6 in panels B, C, or D—and points to very limited potential for selection 
on unobservables based on the Oster (2019) test.24 The calculation here, comparing 
columns 5 and 6 of panel A, suggests that to explain our results selection on unob-
servables would have to be 482 times larger than selection on observables, which 
far exceeds the  rule-of-thumb cutoff of 1 for observational studies. A similarly large 
Oster  δ -statistic of 208.4 arises when comparing the specifications in columns 5 
23 This increase in  R 2 is understated insomuch as the fixed effects fully absorb cells of observations within 
which there is a single migrant. These singleton cells do not contribute to the identifying variation in the point 
estimates, are omitted from the sample size in Table 2, and thus do not add to the  R 2 .
24 The Oster (2019)  δ -statistics are computed as  δ =  ( β c /( β u −  β c )) ×  (( R c 2 −  R u 2)/(0.3 ×  R c 2)) , where  β c is 
the coefficient estimate with additional controls,  β u is the reference coefficient estimate without those controls, 
and  R c 
2 and  R u 
2 are the corresponding  R 2 from the respective regressions.  δ is infinite (or undefined) when  β c =  β u 
and  R c 
2 >  R u 2.
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and  6 in panel  D at the  18-month horizon. In short, selection on unobservables 
would have to be implausibly large to explain the CDS impact on recidivism in 
apprehensions that we find.
Table 2—Impact of Administrative Consequences on Probability of Reapprehension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Pr(reapprehension within 3 months)
Administrative consequences −0.064 −0.063 −0.065 −0.063 −0.064 −0.066
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Oster | δ | statistic 83.7 ∞ 482
 Relative to column  … 2 2 5
Observations 973,171 972,754 713,528 512,727 972,721 495,668
Dependent variable mean 0.206 0.206 0.217 0.214 0.206 0.214
R2 0.060 0.074 0.326 0.401 0.076 0.409
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.061 0.079 0.099 0.061 0.103
Panel B. Pr(reapprehension within 6 months)
Administrative consequences −0.055 −0.054 −0.055 −0.054 −0.055 −0.058
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Oster | δ | statistic 144.4 ∞ 308
 Relative to column  … 2 2 5
Observations 973,171 972,754 713,528 512,727 972,721 495,668
Dependent variable mean 0.226 0.226 0.237 0.232 0.226 0.232
R2 0.053 0.068 0.320 0.396 0.070 0.405
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.054 0.072 0.092 0.055 0.096
Panel C. Pr(reapprehension within 12 months)
Administrative consequences −0.047 −0.046 −0.047 −0.047 −0.047 −0.050
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Oster | δ | statistic 125.8 131.9 291.7
 Relative to column  … 2 2 5
Observations 973,171 972,754 713,528 512,727 972,721 495,668
Dependent variable mean 0.250 0.250 0.261 0.256 0.250 0.255
R2 0.047 0.062 0.315 0.392 0.064 0.400
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.048 0.065 0.086 0.049 0.089
Panel D. Pr(reapprehension within 18 months)
Administrative consequences −0.042 −0.041 −0.042 −0.043 −0.042 −0.046
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Oster | δ | statistic 113.2 60.7 208.4
 Relative to column  … 2 2 5
Observations 973,171 972,754 713,528 512,727 972,721 495,668
Dependent variable mean 0.264 0.264 0.276 0.269 0.264 0.269
R2 0.046 0.060 0.313 0.391 0.062 0.399
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.047 0.063 0.084 0.047 0.086
Interactive fixed effects
Sector × fiscal year × month ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
 … × day of week × time of day ✓ ✓ ✓
 … × age category × birth state ✓ ✓
 … × number of prior apprehensions ✓
Sector × calendar date ✓ ✓
 … × age category × birth state × prior 
apprehensions
✓
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the effect of administrative consequences on the probability 
of reapprehension within 3, 6, 12, and 18 months after the initial apprehension. Sample sizes decline with the inclu-
sion of additional interactive fixed effects because we omit the singleton cells for which there is one observation. 
Standard errors (clustered by sector-year-month) are in parentheses. (See online Appendix Table A7 for p-values 
based on wild bootstrap standard errors.)
20 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: ECONOMIC POLICY AUGUST 2021
B. Other Consequence Programs
In panels C and D of Figure 5, we repeat the analysis in the upper two panels, 
redefining the treatment as an indicator for any consequence, including administra-
tive (AC), programmatic (PC) or criminal consequences (CC). This broader defi-
nition of any CDS sanction implies a larger reduction in recidivism than the AC 
treatment alone. For the most demanding specification in row 6, the estimated effect 
of treatment increases from  − 0.064 for AC alone to  − 0.081 for any consequence 
(AC, PC, and/or CC) at the  3-month horizon and from  − 0.046 to  − 0.061 at the 
 18-month horizon. Like the AC treatment effect, the  any-consequence effect is sta-
ble across  fixed-effect specifications.
Although the  any-consequence treatment implies a larger reduction in recidivism, 
there is little difference in the effects of AC versus PC/CC. This can be seen in 
panel A of online Appendix Table A4, which shows that when entered as separate 
indicators, the AC and PC/CC treatments have statistically indistinguishable effects 
across most time horizons, with the distinct effects of each being slightly smaller 
than the  any-consequence treatment. At the  3-month horizon, for example, the AC 
coefficient is  − 0.066 , which we fail to reject being different from the PC/CC coef-
ficient of  − 0.060 (  p-value of 0.36). We find analogous patterns for the  18-month 
horizon (see panel A of online Appendix Table A5).
Given the uneven application of PC and CC across sectors and time (see 
Section IC), we exploit different sources of spatial and temporal identifying vari-
ation when comparing across consequences, which prevents comparing across AC 
and PC/CC  within-person. Different sources of identifying variation may explain 
why the combined effect of AC and PC/CC is less than two times the AC or the PC/
CC treatment alone (panel B of online Appendix Tables A4 and A5). Alternatively, 
the positive interaction between the AC and PC/CC treatments may indicate dimin-
ishing returns to sanctions, making the combined effects of the sanctions less than 
two times the effect of AC or PC/CC alone.
To gauge the economic significance of the estimates, consider the impact of 
the CDS on recidivism in apprehensions 18 months after capture, as shown in 
row 6, panel B of Figure  5 for administrative consequences and row 6, panel 
D of Figure  5 for any consequences. Between 2008 and 2012, recidivism in 
apprehensions declined by  9.6 p.p. at the  18-month horizon (Figure 1). With the 
 increase in the incidence of the AC treatment of  58.5 p.p.  (73.9 − 15.4) and of 
the  any-consequence treatment by  69.8 p.p.  (85.2 − 15.4) (see online Appendix 
Table  A2) between 2008 and 2012, the AC treatment effect is a reduction in 
recidivism equivalent to  28.0 percent  ( [0.046 × 0.585] / [0.269 − 0.175) ] ) of 
the observed decline, and the  any-consequence treatment effect is a reduction 
in recidivism equivalent to  44.4 percent  ( [0.061 × 0.698] / [0.269 − 0.175) ] ) of 
the observed decline. CDS sanctions thus account for a substantial share of the 
observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions.
In performing this calculation, we hold constant any impact of the CDS on 
the number of migrants who make a first attempt at illegal entry—i.e., the CDS 
impact on  behind-the-border deterrence—which is absorbed by our Border Patrol 
 sector-by-time fixed effects. That is, any impact of sanctions on  behind-the-border 
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deterrence would affect the number of migrants potentially exposed to the CDS 
treatment. If sanctions reduce the number of migrants who choose to make a first 
crossing attempt, there may be less pressure on border enforcement resources, and 
the Border Patrol may find it possible to sanction a larger fraction of the now smaller 
number of migrants that it is likely to apprehend, thereby expanding its capacity to 
deter  post-apprehension illegal entry. Such an outcome would indicate that the total 
impact of the CDS on the number of individuals who are deterred from attempting 
unauthorized entry is larger than that implied by our estimates of the marginal treat-
ment effect of the CDS on  at-the-border deterrence.
C. Restricting the Sample to Time Periods with Low Sanctions Capacity
Our identification strategy is based on the idea that during the CDS rollout the 
Border Patrol agents who decided whether to impose sanctions on apprehended 
migrants did so in an environment in which factors external to the migrant largely 
dictated the sanction decision, at least for the migrants in our sample. As adult male 
Mexican nationals with relatively few prior apprehensions, these migrants both 
account for the large majority of apprehensions during our sample period and repre-
sent cases in which agents had maximal discretion over the disposition of migrants. 
Still, because we do not have an instrumental variable for the sanctions decision, we 
are left to present evidence that substantiates our claim that the Border Patrol was 
frequently subject to capacity constraints in delivering sanctions, which on given 
days would have prevented them from applying the CDS to all of those captured and 
forced agents to effectively randomize over who was subject to the CDS (e.g., as by 
assigning sanctions on a  first-come,  first-served basis).
As a check on the robustness of our results, we narrow the sample to days in 
which the data suggest that constraints on sanctions capacity would likely have 
been binding. These days are those outlined in Section IC, for which according 
to our calculations delivering administrative sanctions to all those apprehended 
would have more than absorbed the available time of Border Patrol agents on duty 
(even without considering the resource requirements of additionally imposing 
programmatic or criminal sanctions). In Table 3, we  re-estimate the specifications 
in panels A and D of Table 2, for the impact of administrative consequences on 
recidivism in apprehensions at the 3- and  18-month horizons; and in panels A and 
D of online Appendix Table A3, regarding the impact of any consequences on the 
 reapprehension probability, also at 3- and  18-month horizons. Because imputed 
capacity constraints register as binding on the majority of days, these sample 
restrictions reduce the sample size only modestly, by  5.9 p.p. (916,032 versus 
973,171 observations) in the column 1 regressions with sector  × year  × month 
interactions and by  2.1 p.p. (485,052 versus 495,668 observations) in the column 
6 regressions with the most exhaustive set of interactions.
The estimated treatment effects are insensitive to imposing the sample restric-
tions. Compare panel A in Tables 2 and 3. For the column 6 specification, which 
controls for the full set of interactions between migrant characteristics, Border 
Patrol sector, and calendar date, the AC treatment effect is  − 0.067 at the  3-month 
horizon with sample restrictions (Table  3) and  − 0.066 at the  3-month horizon 
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without sample restrictions (Table 2), where both coefficients are statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. We also find similarly estimated treatment effects with 
and without sample restrictions for administrative consequences at the  18-month 
horizon (panel C in Table 3 versus panel D in Table 2), and for any consequences at 
either the  3-month (panel B in Table 3 versus panel A in online Appendix Table A3) 
or  18-month (panel D in Table  3 versus panel D in online Appendix Table  A3) 
 horizons. We interpret the  insensitivity of the results to restricting the sample to 
days on which capacity constraints appeared to bind as support for our identification 
strategy.
Table 3—Restricting Sample to Days when Capacity Constraints Bind
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Pr(reapprehension within 3 months)
Administrative consequences −0.065 −0.064 −0.065 −0.064 −0.065 −0.067
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 916,032 915,791 690,393 498,048 916,032 485,052
Dependent variable mean 0.215 0.215 0.222 0.219 0.215 0.217
R2 0.053 0.067 0.321 0.397 0.067 0.407
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.055 0.078 0.098 0.057 0.102
Panel B. Pr(reapprehension within 3 months)
Any consequences −0.073 −0.073 −0.081 −0.080 −0.073 −0.082
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 916,032 915,791 690,393 498,048 916,032 485,052
Dependent variable mean 0.215 0.215 0.222 0.219 0.215 0.217
R2 0.054 0.068 0.322 0.399 0.068 0.408
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.057 0.080 0.099 0.058 0.104
Panel C. Pr(reapprehension within 18 months)
Administrative consequences −0.043 −0.042 −0.042 −0.043 −0.042 −0.046
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 916,032 915,791 690,393 498,048 916,032 485,052
Dependent variable mean 0.272 0.272 0.281 0.274 0.272 0.272
R2 0.040 0.053 0.308 0.387 0.054 0.396
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.042 0.061 0.083 0.043 0.085
Panel D. Pr(reapprehension within 18 months)
Any consequences −0.052 −0.052 −0.059 −0.059 −0.051 −0.062
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 916,032 915,791 690,393 498,048 916,032 485,052
Dependent variable mean 0.272 0.272 0.281 0.274 0.272 0.272
R2 0.041 0.054 0.309 0.388 0.054 0.396
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.043 0.062 0.084 0.044 0.086
Interactive fixed effects
Sector × fiscal year × month ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
 … × day of week × time of day ✓ ✓ ✓
 … × age category × birth state ✓ ✓
 … × number of prior apprehensions ✓
Sector × calendar date ✓ ✓
 … × age category × birth state × prior  
  apprehensions
✓
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the effect of administrative consequences or any conse-
quences on the probability of reapprehension within 3 and 18 months after the initial apprehension. Sample sizes 
decline with the inclusion of additional interactive fixed effects because we omit the singleton cells for which there 
is one observation. Standard errors (clustered by sector-year-month) are in parentheses.
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D. Recidivism in Apprehensions versus Recidivism in Attempted Illegal Entry
As a final exercise, we consider how changes in recidivism in apprehensions—
which we observe—relate to changes in recidivism in attempted illegal immi-
gration—which we do not observe. First, we discuss analytically how the CDS 
treatment effect on recidivism in apprehensions relates to the CDS treatment effect 
on recidivism in illegal entry. Second, we explore empirically whether our estimates 
of the first treatment effect under or overstate the second treatment effect.
Interpreting the CDS Treatment Effect.—In equation (1), we estimate how the 
imposition of sanctions affects the probability that a migrant is  reapprehended in the 
future. This probability can be written as
(2)  P ( R 1 ) = P ( E 1 |  C 0 ) × P ( A 1 |  C 0 ,  E 1 ) , 
where  P ( R 1 ) is the probability that a migrant apprehended at  t = 0 is  reapprehended 
at  t = 1 ;  P ( E 1 |  C 0 ) is the probability that the migrant  reattempts illegal entry 
at  t = 1 , conditional on having been apprehended and having faced conse-
quence  C 0 =  {0, 1} at  t = 0 , where  0 indicates no sanction and  1 indicates a sanc-
tion; and  P ( A 1 |  C 0 ,  E 1 ) is the probability that the migrant is apprehended at  t = 1 , 
conditional on having been apprehended and faced consequence  C 0 at  t = 0 and on 
 reattempting illegal entry at  t = 1 . The treatment effect that we estimate in (1) is
(3)  β ˆ = P ( E 1 | 1) × P ( A 1 | 1) − P ( E 1 | 0) × P ( A 1 | 0) . 
In striving to enhance  at-the-border deterrence, the objective of the Border Patrol 
in delivering sanctions through the CDS would be to reduce the probability that an 
apprehended migrant seeks to reattempt to enter the United States illegally, or to 
engender the outcome that  P ( E 1 | 1) − P ( E 1 | 0) < 0 . Equation (3) makes clear that 
our ability to evaluate this impact is obfuscated by the  reapprehension probability 
and its possible change in response to sanctions.
We (weakly) underestimate the impact of the CDS on the probability that a 
migrant  reattempts illegal entry if  P ( A 1 | 1, E) ≥ P ( A 1 | 0,  E 1 ) . How would sanc-
tions affect the incentive for a migrant to reduce his apprehension probability (e.g., 
by hiring a higher quality smuggler)? Consider two migrants who each have been 
apprehended once, where one was subject to sanctions and the other was not. Under 
administrative or criminal consequences, the sanctioned migrant has lost the ability 
to seek a legal entry visa for five years or more (and voided any visa application 
under review). Because the risk of felony prosecution for a second apprehension 
is low, he may have less at stake in a subsequent crossing than the  nonsanctioned 
migrant, who can still apply for a legal visa (or continue to pursue a visa application 
currently under consideration). After a single apprehension, the sanctioned migrant 
thus appears to have a weaker incentive to reduce his probability of apprehension 
on a subsequent entry attempt, when compared to the  nonsanctioned migrant, in 
which case  P ( A 1 | 1, E) ≥ P ( A 1 | 0,  E 1 ) . Accumulating apprehensions exposes 
a previously sanctioned migrant to risk of felony conviction. Although standard 
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prosecution is rare within our sample, applying to just  1.5 percent of apprehended 
migrants, a sanctioned migrant with multiple previous apprehensions may have a 
relatively strong incentive to avoid apprehension in a next crossing attempt, when 
compared to a  nonsanctioned migrant with the same number of previous apprehen-
sions. This discussion suggests that one way to gauge the sensitivity of our results 
to the  confounding effects of changes in the apprehension probability is to allow the 
 treatment effect to vary with the number of previous apprehensions. Estimating the 
CDS treatment effect for migrants with a single previous apprehension is where it 
seems most plausible that  P ( A 1 | 1, E) ≥ P ( A 1 | 0,  E 1 ) , and that we weakly under-
estimate the impact of the CDS on the probability that a migrant  reattempts illegal 
entry.25
Allowing the CDS Treatment Effect to Vary with Previous Apprehensions.—We 
now allow the CDS treatment effect to vary with the number of previous apprehen-
sions. A sanctioned migrant with a single apprehension (who has lost the right to 
seek a legal immigration visa) may have a weaker incentive to avoid apprehension 
on a subsequent crossing than a  nonsanctioned migrant with a single apprehension 
(who has not yet lost this right but may if apprehended again), in which case, by 
equation (3) our estimated impact of sanctions on recidivism in apprehensions may 
weakly understate the impact of sanctions on recidivism in attempted illegal entry.
Online Appendix Table A6 reports extended regression results for the row 4 spec-
ifications in Figure  5. Panel A shows treatment effects for administrative conse-
quences, and panel B does so for any consequences, where we allow these effects 
to vary according to whether a migrant has one, two, three, or four to six previ-
ous apprehensions. For  reapprehension within 18 months, shown in column 4, the 
estimated  any-consequence treatment effect for migrants with a single previous 
apprehension ( − 0.056 ) is smaller in absolute value than that for migrants with two 
previous apprehensions ( − 0.075 = − 0.056 − 0.019 ), where this difference is sta-
tistically significant. This pattern holds for both administrative consequences and 
programmatic/criminal consequences, and results are similarly comparable at other 
time horizons for  reapprehension.
Taking the CDS treatment effect for migrants with a single previous apprehen-
sion as our most conservative estimate, we obtain magnitudes that are only slightly 
smaller than in Figure 5. In going from the full sample to the  single-apprehension 
sample, the reduction in  reapprehension rates induced by any consequences falls 
from  − 0.079 to  − 0.074 , at the  3-month horizon, and from  − 0.059 to  − 0.056 , at 
the  18-month horizon. These results suggest limited scope for the impact of sanc-
tions on the probability of apprehension to confound our estimates. The CDS treat-
ment effect on recidivism in apprehensions thus appears to be informative about the 
25 A factor affecting the ability of a migrant to finance multiple  border crossing attempts—and therefore also 
affecting the impact of the CDS on the apprehensions probability—is credit constraints (Angelucci 2012). If suc-
cessive attempts to cross the border each end in apprehension, a migrant may be progressively less able to marshal 
the resources to pay smuggling fees on each subsequent crossing. Consistent with this reasoning, data from the 
 EMIF-Norte reveal that the likelihood that a recently apprehended migrant used a coyote (smuggler) on his most 
recent crossing attempt is negatively correlated with the number of times he has been apprehended in the recent 
past (Roberts 2015).
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 more policy-relevant CDS treatment effect on recidivism in attempted illegal entry, 
whose reduction is a prime objective of the Border Patrol’s  at-the-border deterrence 
strategy.
IV. Discussion
The job of the US Border Patrol includes interdicting migrants who attempt to 
enter the country without authorization and deterring either  first-time or repeat 
border crossers from attempting entry. Undocumented immigration is a highly 
contentious issue in the United States, which makes understanding the effective-
ness of Border Patrol enforcement strategies important both for helping inject 
dispassion into the policy debate and for aiding the government in navigating a 
landscape in which it must secure the nation’s borders while respecting public 
sensitivities.
Some critique the government’s success in securing borders against illegal entry, 
while others object to the treatment of immigrants by authorities. Early research on 
border enforcement inspired pessimism about government efforts to deter undoc-
umented immigration. As the number of Border Patrol agents grew in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, so too did illegal entry. Since the late 2000s, the Border Patrol 
has carried out another personnel buildup, while it has augmented its enforcement 
strategy by constructing additional physical barriers, deploying new detection tech-
nologies, and imposing tougher sanctions on apprehended migrants. Sanctions work 
by reducing the viability of legal immigration in the future and by raising the risk 
of incarceration. We find that sanctions have large negative impacts on recidivism in 
apprehensions and, plausibly, on recidivism in illegal entry. The crucial next step in 
designing viable immigration policies is to determine the relative cost effectiveness 
of alternative strategies for deterring illegal entry. Such analysis is not yet feasible 
but would be with expanded access to data on US border enforcement efforts.
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